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Abstract
We investigate the potential economic eﬀects of spectrum trading amongst
ﬁrms who require spectrum licences as part of their activities. Trading takes
place within the technical interference constraints enforced by a regulator.
The model accommodates a variety of markets and ﬁrms, as well as both chan-
nel exchange and channel re-use (i.e. sharing across diﬀerent markets). Our
most detailed analytical results have focused on trade amongst oligopolists
in a given (geographical) market. In this context, our results suggest that
trade can enhance productive eﬃciency by placing licences in the hands of
ﬁrms who value them most (i.e. low-cost ﬁrms). These are the ‘good trades’.
However, there is a danger that this process may cause higher consumer prices
which, in turn, could oﬀset the welfare eﬀects of lower cost production, the
‘bad trades’. An important outcome of our modelling is to make clear a role
played by licences: they provide credible commitment mechanisms to restrict
output.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L10, L50, L96
Keywords: radio spectrum, spectrum trading, imperfect competition.Contents
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The objective of permitting trading in spectrum is to enable this scarce resource
to be allocated to those who value it the most thereby improving eﬃciency. This
section which draws on Leese et al. (2002) and Hurley et al. (2001) investigates
the possible economic eﬀects of such an arrangement in a market characterized by
imperfect competition. We consider ﬁrms operating only in one local market. We
examine the eﬀect of a single trade over an interval for which no further spectrum
is made available for this particular market. We ﬁrst study a regime which imposes
no restrictions on the amount of spectrum that can be exchanged. We show that a
possible outcome is that trade will lead to more spare spectrum, lower output and a
higher price facing consumers. One possible solution is to impose restrictions on the
amount spectrum the can be traded. In some circumstances this may alleviate the
previous problem, but under other circumstances a potentially more serious problem
emerges: trade can result in an exchange that transfers spectrum from the more to
the less eﬃcient ﬁrm.
2 The Economic Model
We now turn to details of the economic model. We consider a single local market
with N competing ﬁrms providing a homogeneous service at a market price P.1
Firm k produces output qk, k = 1,2,· · ·,N and output Q =
PN
k=1 qk. The demand
curve is given by Q = D(P); D′(P) < 0 and we assume that limP→∞ PD(P) = 0.
In what follows we write the inverse demand curve as P = D−1(Q) = P(Q) for short.
Units of output are customer-minutes of some service requiring radio channels as an
input per unit of time (say, the ﬁnancial year).
Dropping the ﬁrm subscript for now, on the supply side labour (L), capital (K)
and radio spectrum (Z) combine as inputs to produce output given a production.
1Later we introduce sectors and in each sector we allow ﬁrms to provide the service across a
number of local markets.
1Let us ﬁrst consider the following very general CES production function which we
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where T is a total factor productivity, a measure of technical eﬃciency. In (1) we
have grouped capital and spectrum together with an elasticity of substitution equal
to 1
1−ξ. The elasticity of substitution between labour and the grouped inputs Z and
K is 1
1−η. Then if spectrum and capital are substitutes, but labour is a complement
to the other inputs we would choose ξ ∈ (0,1) and η < 0.
Alternatively we could model spectrum as a complement to the other two sub-
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Given a production function in one of these forms2 and given factor prices (w,r,a)
per unit of labour, capital and spectrum respectively, we can formulate a minimum
cost function per unit of output c(w,r,a) in the standard way. Associated factor de-




∂a < 0. We assume that each ﬁrm is a price taker in factor markets
and in the market for licences which incorporates all local markets such as the one
modelled in this section. We assume that the price elasticity of demand in the mar-
ket, ǫ(Q) = −
PdQ
QdP, is constant with respect to total output Q. We assume that ǫ > 1
for reasons which will become apparent.
2Yet another form of the production function relevant for telecommunications radio services is
to explicitly introduce base-stations as one of the forms of capital and to model the relationship
between the number of stations, the available spectrum, the number and users and the bit speed
of the service–see ?).
2We now specialize the economic model by considering a ﬁxed technology for
which spectrum is a pure complement and cannot be substituted by capital or labour.
One unit of ‘output’ requires one radio channel and output capacity equals the total
number of channels available. Thus for ﬁrm i to produce output qi per period
it requires ri ≥ qi radio channel licences. We assume that the licence fee a is
independent of the ﬁrm and its location. Total costs include a set-up cost Fi so
total costs are given by
Ci(qi,a) = Fi + ria + ciqi (3)
where ci = ci(w,R) is the cost function associated with the CES production function
of labour and capital in (2).
3 The Cournot-Nash Equilibria
3.1 The Unconstrained Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
In the unconstrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium (UCNE), each ﬁrm chooses output
and purchases just suﬃcient licences to service this output; i.e. ri = qij. In a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium ﬁrm i then maximizes proﬁts given by
Πi = Pqi − Ci(qi,a) = (P − ci − a)qi − Ki (4)
taking the output of all other ﬁrms,
PN
j =i qj = ˜ qi, say, as given.
Writing P = P(Q) = P(qi + ˜ qi) and diﬀerentiating with respect to qi, with ˜ qi
ﬁxed, the ﬁrst-order condition for an internal maximum with qi ≥ 0 is
P
′qi + (P − ci − a) = 0 (5)
Then rearranging and using the assumption of a constant elasticity, ﬁrm i’s market




(P − ci − a)ǫ
P
(6)
3Summing (6) over all ﬁrms leads to the mark-up pricing result:
P =




where ¯ c =
PN
i=1 ci
N . Thus ǫN > 1 ensures that the price in a symmetric equilibrium
is always positive3 ǫ > 1 is also necessary for a proﬁt-maximizing level of output
to exist when the market has only one ﬁrm. In what follows we therefore assume a
price elasticity greater than unity.
To motivate channel trading we are interested in the case where asymmetries
exist between ﬁrms. Then in a non-symmetric Nash equilibrium (6) indicates the
intuitive result that, given the licence price a and the product market price P (which
in equilibrium will depend on a, as (7) shows), the market share of ﬁrm i will increase
as its productive eﬃciency rises (i.e. as ci increases). As ﬁrm i becomes less eﬃcient
its optimal output will approach zero and closure of the ﬁrm occurs. Before this
eventuality however, because there are ﬁxed costs independent of output, proﬁts will
be driven down to zero. We therefore introduce a participation constraint Πi ≥ 0
for ﬁrm i in the Nash equilibrium.4 Outputs are given by solving the following
system (subsequently referred to as programme UCNE) of N ≤ Nmax equations in

















We now make a convenient simplifying assumption to make the process of entry
and exit tractable. We assume that
K1 < K2 < ... < KNmax ; c1 < c2 < ... < cNmax (8)
3It is also a suﬃcient condition for the second-order maximization condition to be satisﬁed.
4Note that in the presence of ﬁxed costs, Πi ≥ 0 implies that qi > 0.
4so that the eﬃciency of ﬁrms 1 to Nmax can be ranked unambiguously in terms of
the cost parameters. Arranging ﬁrms in order of eﬃciency, if the proﬁts of the least
eﬃcient are negative, this ﬁrm is eliminated and the procedure is repeated with
the remaining Nmax − 1. This iterative process is repeated until we arrive at the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium with all ﬁrms having non-negative proﬁts.
The number of ﬁrms who can participate will depend on the distribution of cost
parameters Ki, ci, the parameters describing demand conditions, A, ǫ and the licence
price a. Starting with Nmax potential ﬁrms deﬁned by their cost parameters, ﬁrms
will leave or enter the market as demand conditions and the licence price change.
If the regulator releases a ﬁxed number of radio channels for the market as whole,
then the market-clearing licence price will depend on this number.
Figures 1 to 3 examines the eﬀect on the market of increasing the licence price
increasing from a = 0 to a = 0.35. We choose a demand function Q = AP −ǫ and
parameters values: Nmax = 5, ǫ = 1.1, c1 = 0.80, c2 = 0.81, c3 = 0.82, c4 = 0.83,
c5 = 0.85, Ki = 2.5 and A = 150. Taking total output ﬁrst, Figure 1 shows that
a higher licence price forces up the price and lower output. Interestingly, from
Figures 2 and 3, for our chosen elasticity ǫ = 1.1, the positive eﬀect of a price
increase on the proﬁts of the least eﬃcient ﬁrm outweighs the negative eﬀect of
a higher licence price, allowing it to become viable and enter the market. Proﬁts
initially fall for the most eﬃcient four ﬁrms but then start to rise. A high licence
fee therefore has the eﬀect of redistributing surplus from consumers to producers,
as well as raising revenue for the regulator, and supports a more competitive (high
N) market.
5Figure 1: Output and Licence Price
Figure 2: Participating Firms and Licence Price
6Figure 3: Proﬁts and Licence Price
3.2 The Constrained Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
In a constrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium, ﬁrm i faces a capacity constraint qi ≤ ri,
where ri is the number of radio channels for which it has licences. It then maximizes
proﬁts given by
Πi = (P − ci)qi − Ki − ari (9)
subject to this constraint, taking the output of all other ﬁrms,
PN
j =i qj = ˜ qi, as
given, as before. Notice that licencing costs, ari, are now part of ﬁxed costs and
only aﬀect the ﬁrm’s participation constraint.
To carry out this constrained optimization programme, deﬁne the Lagrangian
Li = Πi + λi(ri − qi) +  iΠi (10)
where λi ≥ 0 and  i are Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints ri ≥ qi
and Πi ≥ 0 respectively. The Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum is








 iΠi = λi(ri − qi) = 0 (12)
7The left-hand-side of equation (11) now deﬁnes the function (1 +  i)f(qi). Suppose
the participation constraint is satisﬁed; then  i = 0. If f(ri) > 0, then qi = ri and
ﬁrm i uses all its acquired channels producing at full-capacity. If f(ri) ≤ 0, then
the capacity constraint no longer holds and qi < ri implying spare radio channels
and capacity. In this case, qi is given by (11) with  i = λi = 0. If in equilibrium
 i > 0, Πi ≤ 0, the ﬁrm exits and we put qi = 0 for that ﬁrm.
The constrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium (subsequently referred to as pro-
gramme CCNE) is then given by solving




















which gives 3N equations in qi,  i and λi, i = 1,2,...,N, given ri, i = 1,2,...,N
and aR. As for the unconstrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium, N ≤ Nmax is the
number of ﬁrms after exits for which the participation constraint Πi ≥ 0.
4 Channel Trading Games
4.1 Game 1: No Restrictions on Trade
We now allow ﬁrms to trade on a bilateral basis and we examine the eﬀects of a
single exchange. We assume that interference constraints are such that no channel
reuse is possible. After agreeing to a transfer of channels at a particular price we
assume that no collusion is allowed and in a new constrained equilibrium two ﬁrms
re-optimize with respect to output independently. Before trade commences the reg-
ulator sells radio channels at price a. In a UCNE, ﬁrms acquire these channels to
8service their anticipated output.5 An crucial assumption is that no new licences are
issued by the regulator after the initial sale of licences. To summarise we have the
following sequence of events:
Stage 1. All ﬁrms acquire spectrum just suﬃcient to service the UCNE at a given
licence price a. Denote output equal to channel licences by ¯ qi = ¯ ri, i = 1,2,· · ·,N.
Let ¯ Q and ¯ P be the corresponding total output and market price respectively.
Stage 2. Firms i = f,g trade and agree a trade of e channels without any restric-
tions on e, at an exchange price.
Stage 3. All ﬁrms (including i = f,g) independently choose output levels in a new
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this stage of the game found by solving the programme
CCNE where the new constraints are:
qf ≤ rf = ¯ rf − e; qg ≤ rg = ¯ rg + e (13)
The appropriate equilibrium concept is a sub-game perfect equilibrium found
by backward induction at stage 3. Each trade redistributes capacity which remains
ﬁxed in total. If ﬁrms continue to produce at full capacity as they do in the initial
Cournot-Nash equilibrium then total output and price remain constant at their levels
in the initial equilibrium. Consumers are unaﬀected by the trade, but ﬁrms beneﬁt
in this case. If ﬁrms produce below capacity after trade, then total output falls, the
price rises and consumers lose out. The condition for price to remain unchanged at
stage 3 λi > 0 i = f,g i.e. from the ﬁrst-order conditions in CCNE
λf = ¯ P
￿
1 −
(¯ qf − e)
¯ Qǫ
￿
− cf > 0 (14)
λg = ¯ P
￿
1 −
(¯ qg + e)
¯ Qǫ
￿
− cg > 0 (15)
Using the ﬁrst-order condition for the original Cournot-Nash equilibrium in UCNE
5Alternatively channels may be issued in a ad hoc fashion (which we actually assume in the
results from the demonstrator described in the report to the Radiocommunications Agency.)
9where ﬁrms produce at full capacity these conditions become:




e > 0 (16)




e > 0 (17)






We have then shown that starting from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with exogenous
licence price a, price ¯ P and output ¯ Q = D( ¯ P) where D(·) has a constant elasticity
ǫ, an exchange of e channels from ﬁrm f to ﬁrm g does not change the price in the
post-trade equilibrium iﬀ (17) holds.
Turning to stage 2, the number of channels exchanged, e, is agreed at a price
arrived at by some bargaining process. The latter does not concern us here (but is
modelled in Hurley et al. (2001) and Leese et al. (2002). Given our assumption of
constant returns to trade the eﬃcient bargain will see all channels transferred from
the less eﬃcient to the more eﬃcient ﬁrm. Let ﬁrm g be the latter (i.e., cg < cf). It








This condition for trading not to result in an increase in the price can be interpreted
as follows. The left-hand side is the real price (i.e, the price relative to the price
of output) of a unit of spectrum. The right-hand side is the market share of the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm multiplied by ǫ−1. As ǫ increases, market falls and the price in a
symmetric equilibrium approaches the total marginal cost c+a. Hence trading may
result in a higher price if spectrum is cheap and/or the ineﬃcient ﬁrm has a large
market share and/or the elasticity of demand is low.
One possible policy response to this result is to limit the quantity of spectrum
that can be exchanged at any time. The next section modiﬁes the game to incorpo-
rate such a constraint.
104.2 Game 2: Quantity Restrictions on Trade
We now impose a constraint on the number of channels that they are permitted to
exchange so that e ≤  , say, where   is determined by the regulator. As   is raised
we then approach the case where a ﬁrm can, if it chooses, sell all its licences and
cease to produce a service. With this restriction the details of the game are pretty














¯ Qǫ, the restriction that e ≤   is a sound
policy that on this occasion prevents the harmful eﬀects for consumers highlighted
in game 1. However our ﬁnal trading game points to any possible drawback from
trading, namely that in some circumstances trading with quantity restrictions can
lead to licences and capacity passing from an eﬃcient to an ineﬃcient ﬁrm.
4.3 Game 3: Arbitrary Initial Holdings of Licences with
Quantity Restrictions on Trade
In our ﬁnal game we stick with quantity restriction on trade but now at stage 1
assume that the initial holding of licences are arbitrary and can be in excess of the
initial UCNE output levels; i.e., ¯ ri ≥ ¯ qi, i = f,g. Suppose ﬁrst that excess spectrum
held by each ﬁrm exceeds the amount that can be traded; i.e.
¯ rg − ¯ qg >  ; ¯ rf −   > ¯ qf (21)
In this case if either ﬁrm acquired   more channels they will still choose the same
UCNE levels of output and nothing in the market will change.
Suppose now that
¯ rg −   < ¯ qg ; ¯ rf −   > ¯ qf (22)
The the eﬃcient ﬁrm g is producing close to its capacity constraint, but the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm f is not. First suppose that up to   channels pass from the ineﬃcient ﬁrm f to
11the eﬃcient ﬁrm g. Since ﬁrm f has excess capacity exceeding   and ﬁrm g now has
more capacity, neither ﬁrm would choose to revise its output and nothing changes
in the market. However if channels were exchanged in the opposite direction, the
eﬃcient ﬁrm would face a constraint rg = ¯ rg −   < ¯ qg and would be forced to lower
its output. Since an ineﬃcient ﬁrm produces less (see (6)) it will not compensate
completely for the reduction if ﬁrm g’s output. Total output therefore falls, and the
price prices. The two ﬁrms will agree to such an arrangement if the rise in price is
suﬃcient to compensate for the higher costs of production (see the example in the
next sub-section).
5 Simulation Results
This section reports simulations results for a simulation model constructed by Hurley
et al. (2001). This model is based on Game 3 above and assumes, for programming
convenience, that ﬁrms only trade one licence at a time. When ﬁrms trade they
exchange the licence at a price determined by a Nash bargaining solution. The
algorithm searches sequentially for trades and allows them if gains exist and inter-
ference constraints are not violated. Both intra-market trades (as analyzed above)
and inter-market trades are allowed.
We choose initial values as follows: Aj = 5, ǫj = 1.2,c ∈ {0.5,1.0,1.5}, nj ∈
{1,2,3,6}. We assume six licences per market, which that may be the result of
piecemeal policy over the years.6 We then proceed to look at trades within a single
market (‘inter-market trades’) and trades between markets ‘intra-market trades’).
Below we present some illustrative ﬁndings.
5.1 Intra-market trades
To begin, consider a market with two ﬁrms, with marginal costs of c = (1.0, 1.5),
each holding three licences. The initial equilibrium has a market price of 2.14, proﬁts
6Justiﬁcation for these initial conﬁgurations can be found in Hurley et al. (2001).
12of Π = (1.46, 0.46) and consumer surplus of 21.47. Outputs are x = (1.28, 0.72).
In this case, there is no incentive to trade: neither ﬁrm gains suﬃciently from the
price eﬀects restricting its rival’s output (by buying a licence) and then increasing
its own.
A slight change generates trade, however (see Table 2). Suppose that c =
(0.5, 1.0), each ﬁrm with three licences. Initial market price is 1.29, we have
Π = (2.13, 0.28) and consumer surplus of 23.77. Outputs are x = (2.71, 0.99)—
both high as a result of the ﬁrms’ lower marginal costs in this example. There is
now an incentive to trade from ﬁrm 1 to 2, the high cost ﬁrm. (Trade the other way
would not alter constraints suﬃciently to change outputs.) This restricts ﬁrm 1’s
output and allows the high cost ﬁrm gain suﬃciently from the resulting high price to
make trade worthwhile. This indicates the role of licences as credible commitments
to constrain output. In fact, trade will continue here until ﬁrm 2 has all six licences
and a high cost monopoly results. The ﬁnal price is 6, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt has doubled to
0.53, but consumer surplus has fallen to 17.47: total welfare (the sum of consumer
surplus and proﬁts) falls from 26.18 to 20.38.
Initially After all trading
Licences (3, 3) (0, 6)
Outputs (2.71, 0.99) (0, 0.58)
Proﬁts (2.13, 0.28) (2.38, 0.53)
Mkt. P 1.29 6.00
C. surplus 23.77 17.47
Welfare 26.18 20.38
Table 2. Simulation Results for Intra-Market Trades
As we allow ǫ to rise, this result eventually disappears. The reason is straight-
forward: the more elastic is demand, the smaller is the price eﬀect of restricting
output, so the lower is the high cost ﬁrm’s gain rom doing so. Indeed, as ǫ rises past
1.4, the incentives to trade reverse and a single trade from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm 1 takes
13place.
Suppose we now have more ﬁrms (say, n = 6), with marginal costs of c =
(0.5, 0.5, ,0.5, 1.0, 1.0, 1.5), and each ﬁrm having one licence. A variety of pos-
sibilities now emerge, depending on the sequence of trades. However, the outcomes
can be partitioned into two sets (see Table 3). In the ﬁrst of these, one of the low
cost ﬁrms monopolises the market (trade ends when it holds all six licences). The
productive eﬃciency of this outcome is not always enough, however, to increase total
welfare, because of the resulting increase in price. In the second set of outcomes,
each of the three lowest cost ﬁrms ﬁnishes with two licences (the others have none).
In this case, the beneﬁts of low cost production are enough to oﬀset the (weaker)
eﬀects of concentration on price, with the result that this set typically increases
total welfare.7
5.2 Inter-market trades
Now suppose that there are four markets, with associated interference constraints as
pictured in Figure 4. Whereas within a market channel re-use was ruled out, between
markets re-use is possible subject to these interference constraints. According to
ﬁgure 4 re-use (i.e., channel-sharing) is possible between markets located at A and
C, and between B and D but not between A and B, B and C or C and D.
A key issue now emerges because it is possible for trading not to terminate. The
reason is that the transfer of a licence across markets has eﬀects on prices in both.
Thus, ﬁrms that may not have been thinking of trading may suddenly become keen
to do so. One solution to this is to introduce a threshold gain from trade below
which trades do not take place.8 In this case, convergence of the trading process
7100 replications of the program produced the second outcome 25 times, a statistically signif-
icantly smaller number of times than the ﬁrst outcome. To the extent that the regulator would
prefer the second outcome, it would be interesting to examine institutional arrangements that
encourage trading patterns which generate this.
8One possible interpretation of this would be a lump-sum tax imposed on the ‘capital gains’
resulting from a trade.
14Figure 4: Interference Constraints
15becomes more common (in the sense that trading becomes increasingly infrequent
as searches for trades take place).
Initially Outcome A Outcome B
Licences (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (2, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0)
Outputs (1, 1, 1, 0.63, 0.63, 0) (6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (2, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0)
Proﬁts (0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.1, 0.1, 0) (1.3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0.6, 0.5, 0.5,
0.2, 0.1, 0.2)
Mkt. P 1.14 3.00 0.86
C. surplus 24.35 20.07 25.77
Welfare 26.45 23.41 27.92
Table 3. Simulation Results for Intra-Market Trades
To give an example, assume there are two ﬁrms in each market in Figure 3 (i.e.
8 ﬁrms in total) and recall that, given the ﬁgure, channels cannot be re-used at
adjacent nodes, but can be at diagonally opposite ones. One ﬁrm in each market
has marginal cost of 0.5, the other has marginal cost of 1.0. There are 9 channels:
Market A has channels 1 and 2; B has channel 3; C has channels 1, 2 and 9; and
D has channels 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. This allocation satisﬁes the interference matrix
constraints in Figure 3.) The details of how these are split amongst the ﬁrms can
be found in Hurley et al. (2001). Now suppose a trading threshold of 1; i.e. only
trades yielding gains of at least this much can take place. In this case, one trade
takes place (from the high cost ﬁrm in D to that in B). This raises output and lowers
price in B suﬃciently to increase total welfare (aggregated across the four markets).
A lower trading threshold (0.75) encourages a second trade and welfare decreases
in our examples. Moving to a threshold of 0.5 encourages enough trade that local
monopolies can emerge. In particular, we ﬁnd that the low cost ﬁrm in each case
acquires three licences each but that total welfare drops. Once the threshold is
at 0.2, trade ceases to terminate—an interesting result given that the number of
markets, and ﬁrms in each, is relatively small.
166 Summary and Policy Issues
We have presented a model to investigate the potential economic eﬀects of spectrum
trading amongst ﬁrms who require spectrum licences as part of their activities. Trad-
ing takes place within the technical interference constraints enforced by a regulator.
The model can, in principle, accommodate a variety of markets and ﬁrms, as well
as both channel exchange and channel re-use (i.e. sharing across diﬀerent markets).
Our most detailed analytical results have focused on trade amongst oligopolists in a
given (geographical) market. In this context, our results suggest that trade can en-
hance productive eﬃciency by placing licences in the hands of ﬁrms who value them
most (i.e. low-cost ﬁrms). However, there is a danger that this process may cause
higher consumer prices which, in turn, could oﬀset the welfare eﬀects of lower cost
production. Subsequent discussion suggests that similar forces are likely to prevail
in the other market settings we cover. An important outcome of our modelling is to
make clear a role played by licences: they provide credible commitment mechanisms
to restrict output. Unlike in other Cournot settings, the sale of a licence forces a
ﬁrm’s output down (assuming it was fully utilising its licences): the licences act as
capacity constraints.
We have also presented numerical results to illustrate the outcomes trade might
create. In the context of intra-market trades, we showed that trade need not occur
and that, if initial allocations are not optimal, they may induce high-cost monopolies.
Other examples illustrated the trade-oﬀ from out theoretical model: productive
eﬃciency versus price rises through increased concentration: we found cases where
trade increased and decreased welfare. We have also seen that the outcomes of
trading my be pathological, with some outcomes being more desirable than others.
This suggests that the design of trading institutions matters. Turning to inter-
market trades, we have seen that trade generally will not terminate, because of
external price eﬀects as licences are transferred across markets. The imposition of
suitable trading thresholds can overcome this problem. Further simulation work is
required to gain a full understanding of the complex forces underlying these results,
17but our illustrative results suggest that trade may have a variety of outcomes.
Finally, let us think about potential developments of our trading model. To begin
with, our model assumes complete information between potential traders. This may,
perhaps, be feasible amongst local taxi ﬁrms (at least as a ﬁrst approximation),
where market conditions and competitors may be well known. It is less likely,
however, to prevail for inter-market trades or for trades between network operators,
where the potential for commercially sensitive information and strategic behaviour
may be signiﬁcant. In such circumstances, the costs of reaching agreement can
be signiﬁcant, as experience negotiating network access terms in New Zealand has
demonstrated (see Spiller and Cardilli (1997)).
This suggests that the eﬃciency of the trading process we have modelled may be
compromised be two types of transactions cost associated with information asym-
metries: bargaining costs and search costs. In the ﬁrst case, our use of the Nash
bargaining solution may need modiﬁcation to allow for other potential disagree-
ments between negotiators. Such ‘non-cooperative bargaining’ involves considerable
technical complexity (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990); Kennan and Wil-
son (1993)) and may, for practical purposes, constrain the situations that can be
modelled. One possible means of overcoming the potential hold-out problems that
can arise here is provided by the US Clean Air mini-auctions: the evidence suggests
that these helped identify an appropriate range of prices for pollution permits and,
therefore, kick-started the pattern of bilateral trades.
Turning to search costs, our model assumes that parties can identify potential
traders costlessly. While, again, this may not be unreasonable in a small local
market, it will be harder to achieve in a densely populated local market or in many
inter-market trades. Theoretical work on ‘matching’ in markets provides some useful
algorithms for resolving these problems (see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), ch. 9)
and it would be sensible to investigate how easily these could be incorporated into
the current demonstrator.
Another aspect of trading that we have not considered is the temporal aspect
18where ﬁrms trade and bargain taking into account the implications of each trade
for future production and trades. Simultaneous trades also raise complications. We
have circumvented these problems by assuming that trades are sequential and the
time between each trade is suﬃciently great to warrant a myopic calculation of
the consequences of the next trade. These assumptions are clearly restrictive. By
relaxing our assumption that ﬁrms are myopic, spectrum would become an asset,
and we would need to consider the potential for intermediate ‘spectrum agents’ and
expectations-based trading.
In terms of extensions, it would also be possible to consider other forms of market
competition (such as Bertrand price competition) and product diﬀerentiation within
a geographical market. Both of these would ﬁt the current framework, and would
allow the model to cover a particularly wide variety of market situations.
Finally, it is important to make clear how our current work (and potential exten-
sions) can link into recent policy consultations in the UK. The Radiocommunications
Agency (2001) consultative document (pp. 33–38) raises several questions in rela-
tion to spectrum trading. To illustrate how our work may be adapted to consider
such questions, we suggest three links here. To begin, there are questions of whether
trading may damage allocative eﬃciency by encouraging anti-competitive practices
(para. 106); this is a danger illustrated by our current demonstrator. Next, the
document asks how such trade might aﬀect investment by existing and potential
operators (para. 111); this is a question that could be examined by adding an initial
investment period to our existing set-up (and note our comments about dynamic
eﬃciency above).
As our third illustration, Question xxxvii asks what “market infrastructure” may
be needed to facilitate trade. This echoes mini-auctions used under the US Clean
Air Act and suggests that we should consider the role for market intermediaries
to lubricate trade. Our work also suggests another intriguing institutional factor
that may lubricate trade: the initial allocation of spectrum amongst ﬁrms. Simple
reﬂection on graphs like that in Figure 3 indicate that there may be circumstances
19where interference constraints reject otherwise productively eﬃcient trades. A solu-
tion to this would be for the regulator to make available extra measures of spectrum
(perhaps more than that required to meet current demands). This could allow ﬁrms
to ‘trade round’ interference problems and place licences with low-cost ﬁrms.
It is clear that much interesting work remains to be done before the net eﬀects
of spectrum trading can be fully understood. Hopefully, however, the present paper
demonstrates the potential beneﬁts of integrating economic and channel assignment
tools for analysing the issues involved. The model is ﬂexible enough to be extended in
a variety of ways and may, therefore, provide a useful framework for future research
in this important policy area.
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